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Reforming Retroactive and Current
Owner Liability Standards in
CERCLA to Increase Fairness and
Efficiency
BRUCE HOWARD*
As Congress and the White House focus on the reauthoriza-
tion of the federal Superfund law (CERCLA or "Superfund"), 1
there will be considerable discussion about the fairness and effi-
ciency of the current standards of liability in the law. This article
focuses on two of the most important categories of liabil-
ity: parties who generated and disposed of the hazardous waste
originally and the current owners or operators of the contaminated
property. With respect to the first category, the so-called "pol-
luter," this article argues that the application of retroactive liabil-
ity to this party creates a fundamental unfairness and inefficiency
in the law. Furthermore, this article contends that the liability
standard for current owners and operators is also unfair and ineffi-
cient, except with respect to post-1980 disposals.
I. RETROACTIVITY
The so-called "retroactivity" doctrine in CERCLA' imposes
liability on responsible parties for actions such as waste disposal
which occurred before 1980, the effective date of CERCLA.
Many parties affected by CERCLA have argued, without much
success, that the retroactivity doctrine of CERCLA is unfair and
* Mr. Howard is a partner in the law firm of Latham & Watkins and is head of the
environmental law group in the firm's Orange County, California office. He is also an ad-
junct law professor at the University of Southern California Law Center where he teaches
environmental law. J.D., 1978, Harvard University; B.A., 1974, Yale University. The views
expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of the members of either
Latham & Watkins or the USC Law Center.
CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1980).
Id.
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inefficient.3 This article proposes a new argument against retroac-
tivity which is more persuasive than past arguments and should
lead to a major reform of the retroactivity doctrine.
Under CERCLA, a number of categories of parties are liable
for the costs incurred by the government or private parties to in-
vestigate and remediate releases of hazardous materials." These
categories of responsible parties include current owners or opera-
tors of the contaminated site, prior owners or operators who
owned or operated the site at the time the hazardous material was
disposed of, transporters who selected the site for waste disposal,
and parties who generated or arranged for the disposal of the ma-
terial.5 Responsible parties are strictly liable; in other words,
disposals in compliance with the law and disposals which occurred
despite reasonable standards of care may still result in liablility.
Moreover, where harm is indivisible, each responsible party is
jointly and severally liable for all response costs.
6
The core of the CERCLA liability scheme is embodied in the
catch-phrase "the polluter pays." Few question this starting point
of environmental liability; for most, the hard questions of fairness
and efficiency arise when one debates "who else should pay?" This
article questions "the polluter pays" starting point itself, and ar-
gues that, at least with respect to pre-1980 contamination, it is the
unfairness and inefficiency inherent in the core liability principle
which undermines the entire liability allocation process.
What could possibly be wrong with the core principle "the
polluter pays?" On its face, it appears to be the ultimate fair prin-
ciple of environmental liability. But this superficial appearance of
fairness is deceptive. While "the polluter pays" principle works
well in most environmental laws, it collapses when examined in
terms of retroactive liability.
Many environmental laws require parties to "retrofit" pollu-
tion control devices onto hazardous waste processes. But virtually
no environmental law other than CERCLA (and its state-law
equivalents) allocates potentially massive liabilities to activities
performed entirely in the past and completed before the law took
' See e.g., United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991); United States v.
Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Conservation Chemicals Co.,
619 F. Supp. 162 (D.C. Mo. 1985).





effect. Arguably, this retroactivity is fair and even necessary given
that the consequences of the past acts still threaten health and
safety.
Ironically, many important environmental laws which are less
retroactive than CERCLA incorporate distinctions designed to
soften their potential impact on investment-backed expectations,
such as the distinction made in the Federal Clean Air Act' be-
tween "existing" sources of air pollution and "new" sources, with
the latter generally receiving far harsher controls than the former.
This distinction may be more reasonable in the context of the
Clean Air Act than in CERCLA because air pollution dissipates
over time, whereas the hazardous waste disposals regulated under
CERCLA remain potentially hazardous for longer.
Perhaps the permanency of hazardous ground waste explains
why CERCLA has no "grandfather clauses" protecting parties
who disposed of hazardous materials long before 1980 and often
long before the disposers knew that the materials were hazardous
or that the materials were being disposed. Section 9607 of CER-
CLA imposes generally the same strict liability standard on all
"responsible parties," past, present, or future.8
For the purposes of assessing liability fairly and efficiently,
there is an important difference between a pre-1980 polluter and a
post-1980 polluter. Assuming that the original effective date of
CERCLA, 1980, is a reasonable approximation of when parties
who generated hazardous wastes reasonably began to appreciate
the true costs involved in disposing of such wastes, the essence of
"the polluter pays" principle is the fair and efficient policy that
businesses should internalize their costs. Only by fully internal-
izing the costs of its operations can a business be forced to operate
efficiently. Consider a business which produces widgets which are
worth up to $5 each to consumers. Suppose also that, fortunately
for society, competition drives the market price down to $4 per
' CAA §§ 101-327, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1983).
8 42 U.S.C. § 9607 does make one interesting distinction between current and past
owners and operators. Subject to certain defenses, current owners and operators are liable
for response costs incurred for threatened or actual releases of hazardous materials on their
property, regardless of when the hazardous materials were first disposed of on the property,
id. By contrast, past owners and operators are only liable if hazardous materials were dis-
posed of on their property during the period of their ownership or operations, id. But as
argued infra, text accompanying note 11, this added criteria for past owners and operators
does not cure the fundamental unfairness and inefficiency inherent in the retroactivity
doctrine.
1993-941
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
widget. This result could occur when the cost of production per
widget is $3 and when $1 profit per widget is a sufficient return to
attract enough capital to construct and operate a widget factory.
Other things being equal, market pressures will drive the price of
the widget to $4, and consumers who value the widget at $4 or
more may buy one. Companies which try to charge more than $4
will be forced down to $4 by competition.' Now assume that
cleanup costs drive the cost of disposing of the hazardous wastes
which result from the production of the widgets from $0 per wid-
get up to $1. Assuming the price of the widget is elastic, manufac-
turers will be forced to increase the price of the widget to $5.
This hypothetical represents the ideal cost internalization sce-
nario. Making the polluter pay simply makes the price of the wid-
get a more accurate reflection of the true, full cost of its produc-
tion. This result is both efficient and fair. The social efficiency can
be demonstrated by increasing the waste disposal cost to $2 per
widget. In that case, the widget can no longer be sold profitably
and will no longer be worth mass-producing. Long term, the fac-
tory would shut down or retool for other products. The costs asso-
ciated with the widget would exceed its benefits for virtually all
consumers. The widget would become extinct. One could say that
the CERCLA liability standard shut down the factory, but at
least in this example the shutdown is the right (that is, fair and
efficient) result.
The ideal cost internalization does not apply to the typical
pre-1980 manufacturer. Assume the old manufacturer based his
or her widget prices on the pre-1980 waste disposal cost of $0 per
widget. The widget could be produced for $3 and sold for $4.
Consumers would acquire the widget happily, keeping for them-
selves the excess value, if any, of the widget. What results from
making the pre-1980 polluter pay for post-1980 cleanups? Sud-
denly future widgets, which cost $3 to produce plus $1 necessary
profit, must internalize an extra $2 of disposal costs. The cost can-
not be added to the pre-1980 price of the widget because all of
those widgets have already been sold. Now a product which con-
sumers want and will pay up to $5 for cannot profitably be priced
for less than $6. The company may go bankrupt. Newcomers may
attempt to fill the void, perhaps by buying the old factory (subject
I See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 9 1.1 (3d. ed.
1986) (comprehensive discussion of the application of economics to various legal fields).
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to the risks of successor liability'") or else will waste valuable re-
sources building a duplicate widget factory merely to make a
fresh start, without the extra burden of the CERCLA costs.
Empirically, it is not clear to what extent these market ineffi-
ciencies are now occurring. What is probably more common is
that large companies are finding their profits arbitrarily depressed
by CERCLA. Theoretically, this effect might reduce the value of
the company, which might be considered appropriate if the value
of the company had been inflated by its historically, artificially
depressed costs. But if the free market drove the price of the pre-
1980 widget down to $4, as suggested above, any excess value was
distributed to consumers long ago. It was not kept in the com-
pany. In other words, a fairer tax would be one imposed on the
pre-1980 customers of the widget company. To the extent future
widget buyers are the same persons as past buyers this may, in
fact, be occurring.
The point of this analysis is that it is both unfair and ineffi-
cient to impose the cost of pre-1980 pollution on pre-1980 pol-
luters, especially if the polluters reasonably did not internalize the
true hazardous waste disposal costs in their pre-1980 prices be-
cause they did not anticipate them.1' And yet this is the core lia-
bility on which CERCLA's liability scheme builds and expands.
Certainly it is the liability allocation which has been perceived as
the fairest and most efficient.
II. LIABILITY OF CURRENT OWNERS AND OPERATORS
Let us now move to the next category of liability: liability of
the current owner or operator which, not surprisingly, is arguably
no more fair or efficient than "the polluter pays" rule. One ration-
O See Daniel H. Squire ct al., Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA: W"o's
Next, 43 Sw. LJ. 887 (1989).
Government should generally avoid imposition of retroactive liability: that
legislation which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a
new disability, for past activities, . . . is unfair and presents an additional
major risk to business decisions because present activities which are legal
may have uncertain legal consequences. This added risk tends to discourage
new investment.
Strock Supports Measure to Reform Superfund in Speech to Lawyers, 6 CAL REPORT
No. 6 (Environmental Protection Agency) Feb. 11, 1994, at 6 (citing Standing Comm. on
Envtl. L., Tort & Ins. Section, Section of Nat. Resources, Eng. & Envtl. L., Bus. L. Sec-
tion, Report to the House of Delegates: Recommendation, 1994 A.B.A. Item No. 108, at 2
(Midyear Meeting, Kansas City, Mo.)).
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ale for the liability of the current owner or operator is that after
1980 businesses and individuals knew about CERCLA, were able
to address the issue of hazardous waste disposal, and should have
internalized any waste disposal costs. Unfortunately, the majority
of CERCLA cleanups do not involve post-1980 waste disposals.
Indeed, by the time CERCLA was enacted, there was already a
federal law in effect, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA),"2 which was designed to ensure that hazardous waste
generators would dispose of their wastes in a manner which would
minimize the need for future cleanups.
Partly to address the inequity of holding current owners lia-
ble for past contamination, CERCLA includes an innocent land-
owner defense, which provides in relevant part that a current
owner is not liable for contamination caused by a prior owner or
operator if the current owner reasonably failed to discover the
contamination notwithstanding commercially reasonable due dili-
gence performed prior to acquisition. 13 The innocent landowner
defense has been widely debated in the literature, with many say-
ing it is largely illusory and practically unobtainable. However,
such objections are outside the scope of this article. 14 Instead, for
the purposes of this article, it is only relevant to discuss the fair-
ness and efficiency of the current owner and operator liability
which is not voided by the innocent landowner defense. Such lia-
bility would involve one of three types of contamination: (1) con-
tamination occurring during the current owner or operator's own-
ership or operation (pre-1980 or post-1980); (2) contamination
occurring prior to the acquisition of the property and which the
current owner discovered prior to acquisition; or (3) contamina-
tion occurring prior to acquisition, which the landowner failed to
discover but would have discovered if it had conducted reasonable
due diligence inquiries prior to acquisition.
As for the first category, this article argues that liability for
pre-1980 contamination is unfair and inefficient because it could
be internalized in the responsible parties' costs. Liability for post-
1980 contamination is fair and efficient but probably involves only
a very small fraction of total CERCLA contamination.
12 RCRA §§ 201-210, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
" CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1980).
" See e.g., L. Jager Smith, Jr., CERCLA's Innocent Landowner Defense: Oasis or
Mirage? 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 155 (1993).
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As for the second category, this liability is often justified by
the arguments that the buyer will factor the cleanup costs into the
purchase price of the property and that potential liability is an
incentive to force the buyer to practice due diligence. " However,
these arguments are flawed. First, the purchase price discount ar-
gument is circular. It assumes current owner liability but does not
justify it. In fact, many if not most buyers who find contamination
before acquiring the property will not buy the property unless they
are indemnified by the seller and receive the seller's covenant to
remediate. Whether the seller discounts the price or indemnifies
the buyer, the net effect is the same: the seller pays for the liabil-
ity. This result is strange because often CERCLA would not have
imposed the liability on the seller otherwise, such as if the seller
had an innocent landowner defense.' 6 Of course, if the seller
bought the property without knowledge of the contamination, it
paid full price. Thus, the net effect of applying the current owner
liability standard to buyers is to void the innocent landowner de-
fense for sellers.
The argument for facilitating due diligence is also flawed.
First, there are already more than enough incentives for adequate
due diligence: no one wants to own contaminated property,
whether or not CERCLA also makes one liable for cleanup costs.
Contaminated property is difficult to develop and occupy and may
expose an owner to toxic tort liability. How can one reasonably
argue that the penalty for failure to perform adequate due dili-
gence should be joint and several liability for any contamination
on the property? Such overkill causes two inefficiencies: buyers
and lenders will overspend on due diligence, and then they will
avoid environmentally marginal properties. Consequently,
remediation and redevelopment are delayed. Finally, current own-
ers who are liable for their own pre-1980 contamination should be
analyzed the same.as the pre-1980 polluter discussed above. Ad-
mittedly, there is slightly more basis for holding current owners
liable than past owners. In many jurisdictions, there is a doctrine
that requires owners to abate nuisances on their properties, 7 such
as dry plant growth that could fuel fires, even if the owner did not
" See Squire, supra note 10, at 906.
"0 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
" See generally John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Validity and Construction of
§ 106(a) and (b)(I) of Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation and Liabil-
ity Act (42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) and (b)(l)), Authorizing Equitable Abatement Actions and
1993-94]
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cause the condition. But query whether such "responsible owner"
doctrines can be stretched into strict, joint and several current
owner liability for massive contamination caused fifty years earlier
by a bankrupt company.
So far we have discussed the strongest cases for CERCLA
liability. The other categories of liability in CERCLA's Section
9607, including arrangers, transporters, lenders, trustees, and past
owners who merely owned the property at the time of disposal, s
suffer from the same inefficiency and unfairness discussed in this
article, plus several additional ones. Then what should be the rule
of liability for past contamination? Unfortunately, the answer is
not simple. Normally one would conclude from this article that
remediation of historic non-negligent contamination should be a
public good funded by taxes, similar to the national defense. But
practical public policy experts will object that government bureau-
cracy is not well-designed for cost-effective cleanups. In fact, the
author's experience with large groups of private parties at major
Superfund sites closely supervised by governmental agencies is
that the efficiency differences between the public and private op-
tions are far less than most people believe. That is to say, both
options are pretty dismal.
CONCLUSION
We are now led to a final, radical proposal. Perhaps CER-
CLA's pre-1980, retroactive liability scheme should be scrapped
completely and replaced with taxes on insurance companies, busi-
nesses and the general public. If nothing else, this suggestion,
coming as it does from a practicing environmental attorney,
should be given the credibility of a statement against interest.
That is because the single biggest advantage of this proposal is the
"delawyerization" of CERCLA. If one remembers President Clin-
ton's Inaugural Address, and the bipartisan ovation after his com-
ment on reducing the role of lawyers in the CERCLA process,
this result may well be the most widely desired goal today in envi-
ronmental law.
Of course such a radical step may lead to other, more com-
plex negative factors. But keeping the more radical proposals,
Administrative Orders and Prescribing Fines for Non-Compliance with such Orders, 87
A.LR. FED. 217 (1993).
18 CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1980).
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such as eliminating pre-1980 retroactive liability in CERCLA, on
the table for more discussion may lead to more creative and ambi-
tious compromises in the CERCLA reauthorization process. At
this point, minor fine-tunings will not address the fundamental
flaws in the law.

